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European nations substitute between employment protection regulations and labor market expenditures
(e.g., unemployment insurance benefits) for providing worker insurance. Employment regulations
more directly tax firms making frequent labor adjustments than other labor insurance mechanisms.
Venture capital and private equity investors are especially sensitive to these labor adjustment costs.
Nations favoring labor expenditures as the mechanism for providing worker insurance developed stronger
private equity markets in high volatility sectors over 1990-2004. These patterns are further evident














We examine how di⁄erences in labor regulations across European countries in￿ uence the de-
velopment of private equity (PE) markets, comprised of venture capital and buy-out investors.
Recent theoretical models predict that countries with stricter labor policies will specialize in
less innovative activities due to the higher worker turnover frequently associated with rapidly
changing sectors (e.g., Saint-Paul 1997, 2002a; Samaniego 2006). We provide the ￿rst empirical
evidence for this prediction at the industry level in the entrepreneurial ￿nance literature. In the
process, we also make a methodological contribution by demonstrating how jointly modelling
the di⁄erent policies for providing worker insurance delivers more consistent results than their
individual relationships. Our techniques may ￿nd application in other settings, too.
We ￿rst observe that European countries empirically substitute between employment pro-
tection regulations (EPRs) and labor market expenditures (LMEs) in the provision of worker
insurance. Figure 1 shows the cross-sectional relationship for 1998. The vertical axis documents
the average LMEs per capita taken from the OECD Social Expenditures database. LMEs in-
clude both active and passive policies designed to facilitate job creation and transitions, with the
majority of expenditures being unemployment insurance bene￿ts. The horizontal axis provides
an EPR index developed by the OECD. Higher EPR scores indicate more heavily regulated
labor markets, factoring in a wide variety of legislation concerning the individual and collective
dismissals of both temporary and regular workers.
This plot illustrates two important features. First, Anglo-Saxon countries provide lower
worker insurance on both dimensions than Continental Europe. These di⁄erences in absolute
levels of worker insurance provided by nations have been a frequent political-economy topic since
at least de Tocqueville (e.g., Alesina et al. 2001, Kerr 2007). Second, the trend line, which is
calculated only for Continental European nations, indicates that economies with higher LMEs
per capita have weaker EPRs. These di⁄erences in the mechanisms used to provision worker
insurance among Continental European nations has received less attention. Denmark provides
the highest LMEs per capita but has the second-lowest employment protection in Continental
Europe. This re￿ ects the well-publicized Danish ￿ ￿ exicurity￿approach that emphasizes high
job mobility facilitated by generous out-of-work bene￿ts and active labor market programs to
promote worker re-entry. Portugal, on the other hand, provides strong security to the employed
but weaker bene￿ts to the unemployed.
While employment protection and transition/re-entry assistance are perhaps substitutes for
providing worker security, they have di⁄erent implications for the costs ￿rms face. Labor
rigidities have a stronger impact on the adjustment margins of ￿rms, especially those undertaking
substantial restructurings. Even if general corporate or payroll taxation is higher to support
1LMEs, the direct incidence on the labor adjustments that ￿rms wish to make is weaker in
regimes favoring LMEs than in strict employment protection regimes. These taxes on labor
adjustments are particularly pertinent for PE investments, which thrive in dynamic industries
that require frequent labor adjustments. This PE focus on high-growth opportunities and rapid
restructuring is necessary for achieving su¢ cient returns when portfolio companies o⁄er the
potential for exceptional investment returns but also carry a high risk of failure.
Combining these observations, nations emphasizing LMEs over employment protection should
be more attractive for the development of PE ￿nancing, even after conditioning on the level of
worker insurance provided. While labor market regulations do not speci￿cally target the port-
folio companies of PE investors, these investors are seeking opportunities that are generally
more sensitive to these taxes on labor adjustment. We investigate this hypothesis using PE
surveys provided by the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association and Venture
Economics. Figures 2 and 3 show that policy choices are correlated with PE placement (trend
lines are still for Continental Europe). European countries with stricter employment protection
have lower PE investments per capita, while those favoring LMEs are more attractive to these
￿nancial forms.
While these correlations are suggestive, many other factors vary across countries besides
labor market policies, and it is quite likely that omitted factors correlated with labor policies
are important for PE formation. Labor market policies tend to evolve slowly in most countries,
limiting the scope of panel estimation techniques at the country level for disentangling these
e⁄ects. We thus test these predictions using a di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences approach similar to
Rajan and Zingales (1998) that employs country-sector variation in PE market size over the
1990-2004 period. We speci￿cally model whether countries that favor LMEs over employment
protection for providing worker insurance develop relatively stronger PE markets in more volatile
sectors. We calculate the volatility of sectors using US establishment-level data from the Census
Bureau, which we take to be the unconstrained case.
Regression estimates ￿nd that the interaction of sector volatility and employment protection
has a negative e⁄ect on PE formation, while the opposite is true for LMEs. While suggestive of
labor regulations having an important bite, the coe¢ cients are sometimes of borderline economic
and statistical importance. As a methodological contribution, we show that the coe¢ cients on
the base policies are less informative than their joint e⁄ect. Studies that evaluate the impact of
labor rigidities modelling one policy only will typically understate the impact of worker insurance
policy choices for economic outcomes like PE investments.
This concept relates back to the policy decisions illustrated in Figure 1. The individual
policies are simultaneously capturing both the level of labor market insurance provided and the
2mechanism used to provision the insurance. An empirical evaluation of an increase in em-
ployment protection will encompass both increases in insurance levels (e.g., Anglo-Saxon versus
Continental Europe) and changes in policy mechanisms (e.g., Denmark versus Portugal). These
two objects are distinct from a policy perspective, however, and it is important to distinguish
their individual e⁄ects as much as possible. Indeed, the simple trend lines in Figures 1-3 can
look quite di⁄erent when the Anglo-Saxon economies are included in the calculation. Through-
out this study, we assess the impact of adjusting worker insurance policies while keeping the
overall level of insurance provided by a country constant. Substantial changes in insurance
levels provided by countries are quite rare, but policy makers frequently contemplate moving
towards or away from ￿ exible labor markets with concomitant adjustments in other insurance
programs (e.g., the recent interest in the Danish model).
We show two techniques to isolate the mechanism of worker insurance provision from the
overall insurance level. One approach is particularly simple, just taking the linear di⁄erence of
two policy coe¢ cients after a multivariate regression. A second approach transforms the base
policies into more intuitive indices. Both approaches ￿nd that policy mechanisms are robustly
important for PE investment patterns, while the overall level of labor insurance provided is of
much weaker importance. This is true on both the extensive margin (i.e., whether PE invest-
ments form at all in a country-sector) and the intensive margin (i.e., the volume of deals in the
country-sector). The e⁄ects are particularly strong for US-sourced venture capital investments,
and we show the sector-level patterns are generally robust to other policy characteristics and
traits of countries.
The ￿ndings of this project are important for policy makers, PE investment managers, and
entrepreneurs seeking high-growth opportunities. Policy choices regarding the optimal levels
and mechanisms of labor market insurance are complex and should consider many economic and
non-economic factors. While it is well beyond this paper￿ s scope to determine how labor market
insurance should be provisioned, we highlight one factor that should in￿ uence this decision
given the desire of many European leaders to promote entrepreneurial ￿nancing (e.g., OECD
2004a). Many policy makers look to active policies like public venturing as a means of seeding or
expanding their entrepreneurial communities (e.g., Lerner 2009). This work instead highlights
how in￿ uential passive policies like general labor regulations are.
More broadly, this study is part of a growing body of academic and policy research exam-
ining how labor market regulations in￿ uence entrepreneurship and productivity growth. Many
observers, both within and outside of academia, believe strict European labor policies hinder
economic restructuring and subsequent productivity growth. The PE funds studied here support
￿rm creation and restructuring. As such, the ￿ndings of this project provide a complementary
measure to studies considering entrepreneurship rates or reallocation measures directly.
3Moreover, our results suggest strong caution in the interpretation of previous work that
￿nds stronger employment protection leads to higher self-employment rates. Some take this
correlation to suggest that employment protection increases entrepreneurship generally. This
study ￿nds the opposite relationship, however, with respect to VC investments and the high-
growth entrepreneurship associated with them. This di⁄erence is evident even in the simple
correlations of Figures 2 and 3. Southern European countries rank very high on self-employment
scales but have smaller PE markets; the opposite is true for Scandinavian countries. There is
substantial heterogeneity in the types of ￿rms founded and therefore in the various metrics of
entrepreneurship (e.g., Glaeser and Kerr 2009). Understanding these variations is particularly
important in evaluating how labor regulations in￿ uence entrepreneurship.
This study also has important implications for PE fund managers and the entrepreneurs
they support. As background for this project, we undertook semi-structured interviews of PE
professionals in ten European countries. Across respondent countries and fund types, investment
managers generally believed labor regulations to be an important factor in the development of
both VC and buy-out markets. Most respondents further rated local labor regulations as
a ￿rst-order concern when evaluating investment candidates, although several noted that they
were willing to enter heavily regulated markets if other advantages existed like high quality labor.
One respondent even suggested that past concern over labor regulations may have hidden some
high-quality opportunities in countries with heavily-regulated labor markets.1
Our analysis provides quantitative evidence of this general pattern. Moreover, the sector-
level specialization that we document is very important for PE placement decisions. This
includes the direct labor adjustment costs of these policies for portfolio ￿rms, but it also extends
much further. Many aspects of PE investment exhibit agglomeration or cluster economies, where
larger numbers of similar ￿rms that are spatially proximate increase the productivity of each
￿rm. Some examples of these agglomeration economies include entrepreneurial awareness of PE
investment models, legal and contractual support, clearly-de￿ned exit opportunities, and strong
local labor markets for specialized professionals. As many of these agglomeration economies are
further speci￿c to individual sectors, PE managers should factor in how these policy di⁄erences
across nations in￿ uence local investment activity. These concerns will in turn in￿ uence location
choices of entrepreneurs anticipating using PE funding to support ￿rm creation and growth.
The next section reviews the relevant literature and theory, highlighting where our study ￿ts
in. Section 3 introduces our data. Section 4 provides our basic empirical results that model the
two labor policies directly. Section 5 then outlines a transformation of the policies to separate
the levels of insurance provided from the mechanisms employed. The last section concludes.
1Two sample interview quotes are: ￿We want our early stage investments to grow quickly to 50-100 employees,
but they may also need to fall back to 25 workers. Strict employment regulations make it less attractive for
starting these risky businesses.￿ Also, "National di⁄erences in labor regulations are an important factor for
where pan-European funds place their resources.￿
42 Literature Review
This section ￿rst reviews the economic e⁄ects of employment protection. We emphasize in
particular how their impact on the labor adjustments of ￿rms di⁄ers from LMEs, an alternative
mechanism for providing worker insurance. We then describe the channels through which these
hindered labor adjustments in￿ uence PE investors in particular.
2.1 Employment Protection Regulations
Theoretical models of EPRs share a common ￿nding that EPRs should dampen labor ￿ uctuations
by ￿rms. This unambiguous prediction contrasts with the models￿di⁄erent predictions regarding
total employment levels and technical e¢ ciency. The ￿rst and unambiguous prediction is the
central building block for this study.
In the standard competitive model of the labor market, EPRs are economically equivalent to
mandated employment bene￿ts. Bene￿t mandates raise the cost of employing workers, leading
to a decline in labor demand by ￿rms for a given wage rate. Workers will increase their labor
supply at a given wage rate to the extent that they value the mandate. If workers value
the mandated bene￿t at its marginal cost of provision, then equilibrium employment levels are
unchanged and wages fall to cover exactly the cost of the bene￿t. In this scenario, the mandate
is e¢ cient and the Coase theorem applies (e.g., Summers 1989, Lazear 1990).
EPRs can potentially improve e¢ ciency when workers value the protections above their cost
of provision. EPRs may be under-provided by the private market due to adverse selection (e.g.,
Aghion and Hermalin 1990, Levine 1991) and risk aversion (e.g., Bertola 2004). Agell (1999)
discusses why eliminating EPRs may not be desirable when labor markets are subject to fairness
considerations and market imperfections, while Wasmer (2006) and Macleod and Nakavachara
(2007) focus on human-capital investment. In the Coasean model, these factors would lead to
higher employment levels after the mandates are imposed. Many of the e¢ ciency gains in these
models operate through a longer attachment of a ￿rm and worker.
Other common deviations, however, can yield e¢ ciency costs when EPRs are introduced.
First, workers may value the mandates at less than their marginal cost of provision, leading to
a weaker growth in labor supply. Equivalently, some of the termination bene￿t may accrue to
a third party, such as an attorney. Collective bargaining could also restrict the adjustments.
In these cases, EPRs drive a wedge between the private and social cost of job separations
and thereby create a deadweight loss. Because dismissal costs are only paid when workers
and ￿rms separate, EPRs result in labor adjustment costs to ￿rms (i.e., a tax on separations).
5Consequently, EPRs that workers value at less than their cost will inhibit e¢ cient job separations.
These ￿ring costs, in turn, can reduce e¢ cient hiring as well for forward-looking ￿rms. The
net e⁄ect of reduced hiring and ￿ring is ambiguous for total employment levels and technical
e¢ ciency, but overall employment volatility does unambiguously decline.2
Within these theoretical models is a common prediction for declining ￿rm-level labor ￿ uc-
tuations due to employment protection. The existing empirical evidence, while small, supports
this prediction. Autor et al. (2007) ￿nd that US ￿rms reduce their annual and quarterly labor
turnover when state-level regulations are passed. Moreover, a substantial decline in the entry of
new ￿rms and establishments is evident. Wolfers (2007) also ￿nds EPRs impact high-frequency,
seasonal labor adjustments, and Blanchard and Portugal (2001) suggest more rigid EPRs can
explain di⁄erences in labor market ￿ ows between the US and Portugal. Stricter EPRs also
account for substantial growth in US temporary help agencies that smooth short-term labor
￿ uctuations for ￿rms. Addison and Teixeira (2003) survey the industry-level evidence of slower
labor adjustment speeds under EPRs.
This labor adjustment cost feature of employment protection is di⁄erent from LMEs, which
partially substitute for EPRs in insuring workers against labor market risks. Under a balanced
budget, general corporate or personal income taxation may need to be higher to support LMEs
than EPRs. The direct incidence of the collective taxation on ￿rm labor adjustments, however,
will be weaker in regimes favoring LMEs over employment protection. Thus, ￿rms and industries
with high inherent labor volatility are disadvantaged, ceteris paribus, when labor insurance is
provisioned through employment protection.3
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to determine either the optimal level of labor market
insurance or the most appropriate technique for implementing a chosen insurance level. The
political economy of employment protection is complex (e.g., Saint-Paul 2002b), and countries
may have constraints on their policy choices (e.g., Algan and Cahuc 2007, Br￿gemann 2007).
More importantly, the optimal insurance design may involve both policies to a degree (e.g.,
Blanchard and Tirole 2007, Boeri et al. 2003). However, we do hope to provide evidence on the
economic impact of these di⁄erent mechanisms, which is a ￿rst-order empirical concern.
2.2 Labor Rigidities and PE Firms
We speci￿cally study the impact of these worker insurance policies for PE investments. There
are two general ways in which labor rigidities are likely to impact PE investors. First, heavy
2Autor et al. (2007) discuss how the basic ￿ndings regarding dampened labor adjustment by ￿rms extends to
the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) equilibrium unemployment framework, too.
3An Experience Rating system links unemployment insurance contributions of a ￿rm to its dismissal history.
This system is employed by the US but otherwise fairly rare. The adjustment costs to ￿rms here are only a
partial incidence that remains weaker than EPR regimes.
6dismissal costs may hinder the development of the high growth or rapidly restructuring sectors
in which these companies specialize. Second, labor rigidities can weaken the reallocation of
resources across their portfolio companies, which is necessary for their returns. We discuss each
of these e⁄ects below, with an initial focus on VC investments. Gompers and Lerner (2002)
provide a detailed introduction to these investment models.
Recent work suggests that strict labor regulations hinder the development of high growth
or rapidly restructuring sectors. This sector-level prediction is more subtle than the general
prediction of declining employment ￿ uctuations noted above. In these models, EPRs reduce
the attractiveness of industries where substantial technical change occurs relative to more stable
industries, ceteris paribus, as a given job match becomes obsolete faster (e.g., Saint-Paul 2002a,
Samaniego 2006, Bartelsman and Hinloopen 2006). These policy di⁄erentials result in compara-
tive advantages for countries with more ￿ exible labor markets in developing sectors characterized
by high labor volatility (e.g., Cuæat and Melitz 2007). Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) also
model how labor regulations can slow reallocation across sectors.4
VC ￿rms are very sensitive to this weakening of high growth, volatile industries. Growing
sectors create opportunities for the rapid development of portfolio companies along with the
markets. Moreover, many screening, monitoring, and reputational features of the value-added
investment model of VC ￿rms are most bene￿cial in these settings characterized by incomplete
information and uncertainty (e.g., Hsu 2004). VC-backed ￿rms can support the emergence
of new technology-based industries, and the available evidence suggests that they are e¢ cient
at these investments (e.g., Kortum and Lerner 2000). We should thus anticipate weaker VC
investments for high volatility sectors in the presence of strong employment protection as these
policies weaken the general attractiveness of these types of industries.
In addition to this industry-level e⁄ect, labor rigidities also hinder VC formation by reducing
the ￿ exibility of investors to reallocate resources across portfolio companies. The majority of
companies in a VC portfolio fail despite the assistance extended, characteristic of most entrepre-
neurial and innovative endeavors. The majority of investments yield zero or negative returns,
with a small number of great successes generating most of the pro￿ts (e.g., Huntsman and Hoban
1980, Sahlman 1990, Cochrane 2005). A successful investor needs to maintain a portfolio of
projects and to reallocate resources aggressively from failing ventures to high-performing invest-
ments. This staged approach yields option values for investments, and an important role of VC
investors is to close under-performing ventures for the sake of better opportunities. These eco-
nomics also underlie many of the legal and structural VC features like syndication, convertible
securities, and control rights (e.g., Kaplan and Str￿mberg 2003).
4Heavy labor market regulations may also weaken general incentives for entrepreneurship. Channels include
greater bene￿ts during employment and greater di¢ culty or loss of social standing should the venture fail.
7Strict EPRs increase the costs of these adjustments and the closures of under-performing
ventures. Importantly, this negative e⁄ect is due to the incidence of the taxation, rather than the
level of labor insurance provided. All else being equal, a higher provision of public insurance may
aid high growth, volatile ￿rms by reducing the compensating di⁄erentials required for employees
to accept the greater job uncertainty. Stronger unemployment insurance bene￿ts and LMEs can
even subsidize volatile sectors when paid for through general taxation. The central question is
how the chosen insurance mechanisms shape the costs ￿rms bear when adjusting employment.
This motivates our comparison of employment protection and LMEs; it further motivates our
e⁄orts to separate the levels and mechanisms e⁄ects.
Strict employment regulations are likely to hinder the development of buy-out investors too,
but for somewhat di⁄erent reasons than VC investments. Buy-out investments are much more
concentrated in manufacturing and industrial products and services than VC investments; high-
tech sectors accounted for only 10% of European buy-out investments in 2000. Moreover, buy-
out investors do not target rapid growth for their portfolio ￿rms like VC ￿rms. Nevertheless, buy-
out investors seek opportunities that frequently require labor restructurings. Past employment
obligations generally transfer to new owners (e.g., a transfer of undertaking). If labor regulations
increase the cost of these existing contracts and their duties, the gap between current valuations
and potential worth must be larger to induce a takeover and restructuring.
Despite these theoretical linkages, our understanding of how labor regulations shape PE
investment is still developing. Much of the literature focuses on the role of ￿ exible labor markets
and non-compete clauses in the spatial distribution of the US high-tech industry.5 Jeng and
Wells (2000) ￿rst empirically evaluated VC development across countries using multivariate
analyses. In cross-sectional analyses, they ￿nd strict labor regulations (modeled using labor
market tenures) hindered early-stage VC investment but not later-stage investments. In a
subsequent study of the cyclicality of the VC industry, Romain and van Pottelsberghe (2004)
￿nd that labor market rigidities (modeled through EPR indices) reduce the impact of a country￿ s
expansions in GDP or technical knowledge for concomitant growth in its VC industry.6
The empirical evidence for industry-level di⁄erences due to worker insurance policies is even
rarer. The paper closest in spirit to ours is Da Rin et al. (2006). In a very interesting
paper, the authors ￿nd within-country variations of manager￿ s perceptions of hiring and ￿ring
conditions (modeled through IMD management surveys) reduce the ratio of high-tech funding
to total PE investments. Given the interests of their study, they do not pursue this angle
further. Two papers from the broader economics literature are also relevant for this topic.
5See Gilson (1997), Hyde (1998), Stuart and Sorenson (2003), Fallick et al. (2006), and Marx et al. (2009).
6Bozkaya and Kerr (2007).provide extended references regarding a second literature strand that considers
the impact of labor market policies on entrepreneurship rates. European evidence includes Ilmakunnas and
Kanniainen (2001) and Kanniainen and Vesala (2005).
8Micco and PagØs (2007) ￿nd that stringent employment protection reduces the sizes of sectors
characterized by high intrinsic labor volatility. Moreover, employment ￿ uctuations in these
volatile sectors is dampened. Cuæat and Melitz (2007) further relate more ￿ exible labor markets
to comparative advantages in trade for industries with high labor volatility. Empirical evidence
on this prediction is just emerging, and our study contributes evidence from PE placements.
We also hope to draw attention to the levels versus mechanism e⁄ects.
3 Data Preparation
This section describes our data sources. We begin with our data on labor market policies. We
then document the PE data used to measure our dependent variables. We ￿nally discuss our
measurement of the inherent volatilities of di⁄erent industries.
3.1 Labor Market Insurance Policies
Our EPR index is sourced from the OECD (2004b) with a theoretical range from zero to ￿ve.
Higher EPR scores indicate more heavily regulated labor markets, factoring in a wide variety
of legislation concerning the individual and collective dismissals of both temporary and regular
workers. In practice, the lowest score in 1998 is the US at 0.2, while Turkey is judged to have
the most stringent restrictions at 3.8.
Table 1 documents the index for our European sample. Switzerland (1.1), Denmark (1.4),
and Portugal (3.7) are the extreme values for 1998 within the Continental Europe sample. The
UK (0.6) and Ireland (0.9) provide intermediate levels between the US (0.2) and the most ￿ exible
labor markets in Continental Europe. Most countries either receive the same EPR rating in
1990 and 1998 or move toward more ￿ exible labor markets, especially for temporary workers.
Only France increases its protection, from 2.7 to 3.0.
LMEs are taken from the OECD Social Expenditures database and include unemployment
insurance bene￿ts and active labor market policy expenditures. Unemployment insurance com-
prises approximately 60% of the total, with this share declining somewhat in recent years. Active
labor market programs include all social expenditures, excepting education, that are designed to
improve the bene￿ciaries￿prospects for ￿nding employment or increasing earnings. Examples
include labor market training, school-to-work transition assistance for youth, and labor market
programs to promote employment for the unemployed.
Table 1 documents each country￿ s average annual LMEs expressed as nominal ECUs/Euros
per capita. Denmark provides the highest LMEs per capita (1482) in 1998-2001, over 50%
9larger than the next highest observation of Sweden (865). Portugal (165) and the UK (173) are
the lowest values in the sample, with Greece (67) and the US (140) providing even less. The
unweighted average of nominal LME per capita is roughly constant across the 1990-1997 and
1998-2001 periods, with a mixture of countries increasing or decreasing.
3.2 European PE Data
Our PE data are taken from the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association
(EVCA) and Venture Economics (VE). EVCA surveys are conducted by PriceWaterhouse Coop-
ers and Thomson Financial. The EVCA provided us statistics on ￿fteen European nations from
1990 to 2004. Table 1 documents country-level PE investments by domestic investors over
the period. The largest European PE community, in both absolute and per capita investment
terms, is the UK. Continental European countries with high per capita investment levels are
Sweden and the Netherlands, while France, Germany, Italy, and Spain also maintain signi￿cant
aggregate investment levels due to their large country sizes. In examining Table 1, it should be
noted that a number of zeros are small investment levels that appear zero on a per capita basis.7
The central advantage of the EVCA data are their fairly consistent measurement of PE
markets across European countries and industrial sectors during the 1990-2004 period. This
consistency for innovative sectors is substantially better than most other sources of economic
data. There are, however, two liabilities that directly in￿ uence our empirical approach. First,
VC and buy-out investments are separately reported at the aggregate level but not within sectors.
This is unfortunate as many of the rationales in the previous section would suggest a stronger
impact for VC investors than buy-out ￿rms, and we would prefer to quantify these di⁄erences.
Second, the EVCA data do not allow us to consider cross-border investments within Europe.
Approximately 75% of European PE investments recorded by the EVCA are raised within the
investing country (an unweighted average across countries). Our EVCA data report the amounts
invested abroad by European countries, but the destination countries are not identi￿ed. Again,
this distinction is not made at the sector level either. We focus on the investment amounts for
countries in this paper.
We also look at US-based investments into Europe using data taken from Thomson Financial￿ s
Venture Economics (VE) database. The EVCA surveys all PE ￿rms with a physical presence
in Europe, regardless of EVCA membership status. VE contains deal-level data for US PE
￿rms that allow us to tally investments originating in the US for European portfolio ￿rms. In
some cases, the US PE ￿rms may have opened o¢ ces in Europe, although this practice was
7We exclude Greece from the analysis due to incomplete EVCA and VE data. We will use Greece, however,
in our calculations of labor insurance levels and mechanisms below.
10not common until the end of our sample. The US data are thus important for providing a
comprehensive view of the emergence of European PE markets.
Moreover, the US-sourced investments provide several methodological advantages. Most
importantly, aggregating from individual deals allows us to separate VC and buy-out investments
by country and sector for US investments into Europe, a joint disaggregation not feasible with
the EVCA data. Second, these cross-border investments are less in￿ uenced than domestic
European investments by unmodeled factors like public venturing. Finally, these cross-border
investments are a recent phenomena, largely coming about during the last decade, long after
labor insurance policies have been devised. This timing aids in assigning causal directions to
the analyses.
One liability of the VE data is that investment amounts are missing from about 30% of the
reported deals. For this reason, much of our analyses below focus on the count of deals by
country-sector, which we can identify consistently in both data sources. To analyze the overall
value of the PE markets, we impute the missing VE values through a two-step procedure.8 This
imputation is mainly for descriptive purposes and of limited analytical consequence. We note
where a deviation occurs as we present the results, and the use of imputed data is always in the
direction of making our results more conservative.
Finally, it is important to note that substantive di⁄erences exist between the PE-supported
entrepreneurship studied here and entrepreneurship de￿ned through self employment. The sur-
vey by Addison and Teixeira (2003) notes a consistent empirical ￿nding of a positive association
between stronger employment protection and self-employment rates. Table 1 suggests that this
relationship is unlikely to hold in estimations of cross-country PE di⁄erences within Europe.
Southern European countries like Portugal and Greece rank very high on self-employment scales
but have smaller PE per capita markets. On the other hand, Scandinavian countries rank low
on self-employment indices, but have been among the most successful European countries in
attracting VC and buy-out investments.9
3.3 Sector Labor Volatilities
Our analysis centers on di⁄erences across industries in inherent labor volatilities in an empirical
framework similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Carlin and Mayer (2003). Measuring the
8We ￿rst regress available deal amounts on vectors of ￿xed e⁄ects for countries, industries, years, and number
of investors. We then predict deal values for missing observations using the estimated parameters. The
predictions take negative values for a small fraction of the observations, which we replace in the second step with
the minimum deal amount by industry and type for these cross-border transactions in VE. This procedure is
done separately for VC and buy-out investments.
9Ardagna and Lusardi (2009) and Glaeser and Kerr (2009) further discuss these di⁄erences in entrepreneur-
ship metrics and policy environments. Bottazzi et al. (2004) and Bozkaya and Kerr (2007) provide a deeper
introduction for European PE markets.
11inherent labor volatilities, as opposed to the realized labor volatilities by country and sector, is
important given that labor regulations directly in￿ uence realized employment ￿ ows. We model
these inherent volatilities using US labor turnover calculated from the Longitudinal Business
Database (LBD). We take the labor volatility of ￿rms in the US to be the most unconstrained
as in Figure 1. In a hypothetical industry with no inherent labor volatility, we would not expect
signi￿cant di⁄erences across European regimes. Employment dismissal costs are likely to be
more binding, however, in sectors where the US demonstrates substantial labor churn. Under
some conditions, these sector-level di⁄erences are augmented by the general equilibrium e⁄ects
of comparative advantage and trade.
Sourced from US tax records and Census Bureau surveys, the LBD provides annual obser-
vations for every private-sector establishment with payroll from 1976 onwards. In 1997, the
data include 108 million workers and 5.8 million establishments. Each establishment is given a
unique, time-invariant identi￿er that can be longitudinally tracked. Second, the LBD assigns
￿rm identi￿ers that facilitate the linkages of establishments. Davis et al. (1996) and Kerr
and Nanda (2009) further describe these data. Our primary measure of labor volatility is the





where E is the employee count of the establishment. We calculate ABS at the establishment
level, versus the ￿rm level, to allow the most accurate sector assignments possible. This measure
is bounded between zero and two and reduces the impact of outliers. Autor et al. (2007) further
motivate the ABS metric of labor volatility and relate it to the reallocation metrics developed
by Davis et al. (1996).
After calculating ABS at the establishment-year level, we take the mean across establish-
ments within each sector over the 1977-1999 period. We denote this sector-level mean as
LaborUS
s . We also calculate a second version of ABS at the sector level for 1992-1999 (i.e.,
net employment changes at the sector-year level). These two metrics have a 0.73 correlation
across industries. We ￿nd consistent results across a range of approaches and time periods for
calculating US labor volatility, and we report these two as representative cases.
As the LBD classi￿es establishments with the SIC4 framework, we develop concordances
that link the EVCA sectors, VE technology codes, and the US SIC system. Table 2 lists the 17
EVCA sectors and the two volatility calculations. The Computer-Related (0.52) and Energy
(0.49) sectors have the largest mean US labor turnover, while Chemicals and Materials (0.28)
and Industrial Products and Services (0.31) have the lowest. Appendix Table 1 provides the
EVCA￿ s sector de￿nitions. The LBD cannot support accurate calculations for Agriculture,
12Construction, and Other sectors. These sectors are small in terms of PE investment and are
excluded below. The concordances used in this project are available upon request.
4 Empirical Results with Base Policies
We have two predictions to test. Our ￿rst hypothesis is that countries providing worker insurance
through LMEs versus employment protection will have comparatively stronger PE development
in sectors characterized by high intrinsic labor volatility. Our second and related hypothesis is
that the mechanism used to provision worker insurance is more important for these placement
patterns than the absolute level of worker insurance provided. This section con￿rms the ￿rst
prediction with country-sector regressions that model the base policies. We introduce a simple
linear test in a multivariate framework that is comparable to previous studies. We analyze the
second prediction in the next section after transforming the base policies.
4.1 Empirical Speci￿cation
Our basis speci￿cation takes the form,
PEc;s = ￿c + ￿s + ￿EPREPRc ￿ Labor
US
s + ￿LMELMEc ￿ Labor
US
s + "c;s: (2)
We use this empirical framework to test separately both the extensive and intensive margins
of PE investment by country-sector. In extensive margin frameworks, PEc;s is a dichotomous
indicator variable for PE investment in country c and sector s in the 1990-2004 period. The
dependent variables in the intensive margin estimations are the log counts and value of PE
investments by country-sector. We also discuss average deal sizes.
Multiple country-sector observations receive very small investments over the period studied.
Accordingly, we de￿ne the entry threshold for extensive margin analyses as annual PE invest-
ment of one Euro/ECU per capita in the sector. In the EVCA, 56% of domestic-sourced PE
observations at the country-sector level achieve this investment threshold. For US-sourced PE
investments, 21% of VC and 23% of buy-out observations reach this level. This threshold mainly
in￿ uences the domestic-sourced entry calculation, as every country-sector combination has at
least a trace amount of investment over the 1990-2004 period in the EVCA data. The results
presented below are generally robust to adjusting this threshold amount so long as a meaningful
degree of variation remains.
For explanatory variables, we interact the two labor market policies, EPRc and LMEc, with
the sector-level US labor volatility metric LaborUS
s . LMEc is the log value of LMEs per capita.
13￿c and ￿s are vectors of country and sector ￿xed e⁄ects, respectively. Country ￿xed e⁄ects absorb
the main e⁄ects of the labor market policies, while sector ￿xed e⁄ects absorb the main e⁄ects
of LaborUS
s . As these ￿xed e⁄ects also control for overall European PE investment behavior
by country and sector, we only exploit residual variation for identi￿cation. The explanatory
variables are transformed to have unit standard deviation for interpretation. Estimations are
weighted by an interaction of country population with total sector size across countries. The
interaction of 15 countries and 14 sectors yields 210 observations per regression on the extensive
margin. Intensive margin analyses are conducted over country-sector observations where positive
investments exist.
4.2 Domestic European Investments
Table 3 presents the results for domestic PE investments. The ￿rst two columns are extensive
margin analyses, while the last four columns document the intensive margin estimations. De-
pendent variables are indicated by column headers. The ￿rst column for each outcome measure
uses the establishment-level calculation of US labor volatility; the second column employs the
sector-level calculation. While some minor di⁄erences emerge within these pairs, the results are
generally robust to the volatility calculation employed.
Focusing on Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3, we ￿nd a negative ￿EPR elasticity in both models.
This suggests that employment rigidities lower PE investment entry in volatile sectors, but the
results are not very strong or conclusive. On the other hand, the ￿LME coe¢ cient is positive and
indicative of stronger labor market insurance expenditures increasing PE investment in volatile
sectors. Both elasticities are statistically signi￿cant at a 90% con￿dence level. Based upon
these elasticities, one might conclude that labor policies are only marginally important for the
entry of domestic PE ￿rms. Yet, the introduction and Figure 1 emphasize how these policies
are jointly chosen. This suggests that their joint strength may be more important than their
partial elasticities.
To test this, we begin with a conceptual model where the level of worker insurance provided
is determined by g(EPR;LME) = ￿EPREPRc + ￿LMELMEc. This g(￿) function assumes the
two policies are additive and separable, and the alphas weight the importance of each policy
for worker insurance. Consider the scenario where a policy maker seeks to maintain a level
of insurance I but to move from an EPR-based regime to greater LMEs. Holding I constant
and assuming relationship (2) is correctly de￿ned, the comparative static for moving along
the insurance mechanism frontier de￿ned in g(￿) for its impact on PE investment is ￿PE =
￿LME ￿ ￿EPR ￿ (￿LME=￿EPR):
The bottom of Table 3 presents this comparative static with g(￿) de￿ned by ￿LME = ￿EPR.
This equal contribution of EPRs and LMEs to worker insurance is motivated by the policy
14trade-o⁄ within Continental Europe in Figure 1. The linear combinations of ￿LME ￿ ￿EPR are
much more stable and well measured than the individual policies are. The joint test suggests
that a one standard deviation change from employment protection towards LMEs is associated
with an 8% higher probability of PE entry for sectors with high labor volatility compared to
sectors with low volatility. In a much clearer way than the individual policies do, this joint e⁄ect
con￿rms the importance of the mechanism used to provision labor insurance on the pattern of
PE placements. The implied magnitude of a contemplated policy reform is also twice as large.
The next two columns consider the intensive margin of PE entry through the log counts of
investments. The sample size remains the same as the ￿rst two columns since at least one
deal is observed for every country-sector in the EVCA data. The individual interactions of both
policies are now larger and statistically signi￿cant. Their joint e⁄ect again suggests that a policy
movement along the insurance frontier will have twice the e⁄ect that the individual coe¢ cients
would suggest. Comparing Columns 3 and 4, the measured joint elasticity is also more stable
than the individual policy coe¢ cients. This greater stability for the linear di⁄erence compared
to the levels of the underlying coe¢ cients is repeatedly observed in our analysis.
A one standard deviation policy adjustment by a nation towards LMEs from employment
protection is associated with 20% more deals in high labor volatility industries compared to low
volatility industries. While this numerical value is larger than the entry probability adjustment
of 8%, the earlier 8% e⁄ect is larger in terms of the underlying variation in the data. The
contemplated policy adjustment is associated with a 0.2 standard deviation change in entry
levels and a 0.13 standard deviation change in investment magnitudes. Both margins are thus
important.
Finally, the last two columns of Table 3 ￿nd similar e⁄ects for log investment levels. Com-
paring Columns 3 and 4 with Columns 5 and 6 would suggest that as deal counts grow, average
deal sizes slightly decline. This pattern would be expected in many investment selection models,
but the declines in average deal size are quite small and one cannot reject the null hypothesis of
constant average deal size. The impact of the labor policy environment thus appears stronger
on the number of domestic deals undertaken (i.e., market formation and size) versus deal size.10
4.3 US-Sourced Investments
To complement Table 3￿ s domestic analysis, Table 4 examines US-sourced investments into
Europe. Panel A provides results for venture capital placements, and Panel B documents buy-
out investments. These US-based investments were very trivial at the start of the sample period,
10Related work on estimating average sizes includes Ardagna and Lusardi (2010), Da Rin et al. (2010), and
Kerr and Nanda (2010).
15but grew remarkably after 1990. The patterns of overseas placements, coming well after basic
labor policies were established, thus aid in a causal interpretation of the ￿ndings. As noted in
the data description, US-based investors are also less likely to be in￿ uenced by public venturing
and similar industrial policies, which we have not yet controlled for in the analysis.
The pattern in Panel A is very similar to Table 3￿ s domestic analysis. The entry probability
is 8%-9% higher, and investment counts are 25% higher. The sizes of the two e⁄ects are
comparable to the underlying data at approximately 0.2 standard deviations. There is some
evidence of larger investment sizes in this context, but the precision of the underlying average
deal size e⁄ect again does not yield a conclusive ￿nding regarding deal traits.11
The pattern for buy-out investors, however, is somewhat di⁄erent. We again see evidence for
greater investment counts in volatile sectors as policies shift away from employment protection.
The magnitude, however, is half of the comparable e⁄ect for US-sourced VC placements. This
diminished impact is true in both reported elasticities and in comparison to the underlying data
variation. There is also no evidence for an entry margin e⁄ect. In fact, both policies have
negative elasticities, a point to which we return in the next section when discussing the level of
labor market insurance. Finally, there is perhaps the best evidence for a change in investment
size with respect to these buy-out placements. While interesting, we again cannot reject the
null hypothesis that deal size is una⁄ected.
Overall, Table 4 ￿nds fairly consistent evidence that US-sourced VC placements are quite
sensitive to these labor insurance policies, while buy-out investors are less in￿ uenced. It is
likely that a similar pattern would hold if we could disaggregate domestic-sourced PE invest-
ments. While we cannot directly undertake this test, we do know at the national level from the
EVCA data the share of domestic PE investments that are buy-out investments. Unreported
estimations ￿nd that the measured labor policy e⁄ect is higher in countries with smaller buy-out
shares than in those with larger buy-out communities. We hope that future studies can develop
data to con￿rm this suggestive e⁄ect.
Taken as a whole, Tables 3 and 4 support the hypothesis that labor insurance mechanisms
matter. E⁄ects of these policy choices are stronger in sectors with greater labor volatility,
measured through the relatively unconstrained US case, than those with weaker labor turnover.
We provide further robustness checks on this pattern at the end of the next section, but we next
turn to transformation of the underlying policies that are easier to interpret.
11Entry margin estimations in Columns 1 and 2 without the imputed VE deal values yield larger e⁄ects than
the reported estimations. We believe this added strength is spurious, however, and prefer the more conservative
approach that uses all available data.
165 Empirical Results with Transformed Policies
The previous section highlights that incorporating base labor market policies directly into re-
gressions captures both di⁄erences across nations in the level of labor insurance provided and
di⁄erences in the technique employed. Our proposed linear test provides a more consistent es-
timator, but the ideal estimation would separately quantify both traits as they are distinct from
a policy perspective. While both traits are exceptionally complex and multi-dimensional, this
section develops simple proxies de￿ned as LbrInsLevelc and LbrInsMechc. These transforma-
tions are used to test our second hypothesis that the insurance mechanism is more important
for PE development and specialization than the overall insurance level.
5.1 Policy Transformations
To calculate LbrInsLevelc and LbrInsMechc, we ￿rst transform EPRc and LMEc to have zero
mean and unit standard deviation. The resulting metrics are less dependent upon the scale
through which they are originally measured. We then measure the single-dimension distance
for each policy from the lowest observed values in the OECD sample (i.e., US in employment
protection, Greece in LMEs per capita). Both of these distances have a maximum of less than
four standard deviations. We calculate LbrInsLevelc as the average of these distances for each
observation. This level index estimates in standard deviations the distance from a country￿ s
joint provision of (EPR, LME) to the lowest observed values in the OECD. Table 1 documents
these values, and the vertical axis of Figure 4 plots these distance metrics. The UK provides
the weakest labor market insurance measured through this technique, followed by Ireland and
Switzerland. Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden are among the highest insurance levels.
The second metric, LbrInsMechc, describes the mechanism employed for providing this labor
market insurance. It is a radian measure of the LME distance divided by the EPR distance.
LbrInsMechc can be thought of as the slope of a ray extending from the origin of Figure 1
to the nation￿ s position in (EPR, LME) space. The radian measure is a simple monotonic
transformation of the base distance ratio that is bounded by [0;￿=2]. This transformation
eliminates the asymmetry that arises with a simple ratio. Larger values of LbrInsMechc
indicate greater reliance on LMEs than EPRs for providing worker insurance. Portugal, Italy,
and Spain are the lowest values, indicating very strong dependency on employment protection,
while Denmark, Switzerland, Ireland, and the UK most emphasize LMEs. The values are again
listed in Table 1 and are plotted as the horizontal axis of Figure 4.
The trend line for Continental Europe in Figure 4 is very ￿ at, illustrating better than Figure
1 the empirical substitution of European economies between LMEs and EPRs for the provision
17of labor insurance. This approximate orthogonality of the two indices for Continental Europe
is not by construction but instead the result of selected policy levels. Including Ireland and the
UK in the trend line results in a negative correlation of about -0.4. In words, countries providing
higher levels of labor market insurance tend to employ more stringent employment protection
when the Anglo-Saxon economies are incorporated. Within Continental Europe itself, however,
there is no clear relationship between the estimated level of labor insurance provided and the
mechanisms employed.
5.2 Domestic and US-Sourced European Investments
Tables 5 presents our domestic analyses with these transformed policy variables in a framework
similar to speci￿cation (2). As would be expected, our results for labor mechanism index closely
parallel the estimates discussed in Table 3. We again ￿nd strong evidence that labor insurance
policies tilted away from employment protection are associated with stronger PE entry and
investment levels in more volatile sectors. The transformation of the underlying policies makes
the results easier to interpret.
Our proposed transformation also allows us to assess the relative importance of the total level
of worker insurance provided as opposed to the policy mechanism used to implement it. The
levels coe¢ cients in Table 5 are uniformly smaller than the mechanism coe¢ cients. When em-
ploying sector-level labor volatility measures, the elasticities for insurance levels are statistically
di⁄erent from zero and suggest that higher levels of insurance, conditional on the mechanism
employed, promote more PE investment in more volatile sectors. The positive e⁄ects using the
establishment-level volatility calculation, however, are not statistically di⁄erent from zero.
Tables 6 presents our analyses of US-sourced investments with these transformed policy
variables. The patterns for US-sourced VC investments are very strong with respect to insurance
mechanisms. On the other hand, the levels of worker insurance provided do not appear to
in￿ uence these investors. Buy-out investors again behave di⁄erently with respect to the entry
margin and similarly in terms of investment counts. Our evidence suggests that the entry
of buy-out ￿rms is negatively in￿ uenced by the level of labor insurance provided, even after
controlling for the mechanism used to implement it. This was re￿ ected in Table 4￿ s ￿nding that
both base policies had a negative elasticity for buy-out entry. We do not have a strong rationale
for this e⁄ect, and we hope that others evaluate whether this ￿nding holds more generally.
We thus conclude that the mechanism used to provide worker insurance is the more important
attribute for PE investors. The evidence suggests that the absolute level of insurance provision
can have a positive or negative e⁄ect depending upon investment type and margin analyzed.12
12Our discussion also suggests a broader prediction that PE investment for a country as a whole will be
185.3 Robustness Checks
Table 7 provides some basic robustness checks on our speci￿cation design. We report the
patterns for the EVCA domestic inventors, with the US-based investments showing comparable
sensitivities. Panel A repeats the base estimation for convenience.
Panel B incorporates additional national policies to test whether the insurance mechanism
index is simply re￿ ecting other policies that encourage PE formation. Similar to the main
regressors, these additional policies are interacted with US labor volatility by sector. Our factors
include the strength of IPO markets (e.g., Black and Gilson 1998, Michelacci and Suarez 2004),
corporate tax rates (e.g., Da Rin et al. 2009), business entry regulation barriers (e.g., Fonseca
et al. 2001, Klapper et al. 2006, Ciccone and Papaioannou 2007), and the share of national
investments made by public investment funds (e.g., Leleux and Surlemont 2003). As discussed
above, we also control for the share of buy-out investment in the country. The unreported
coe¢ cients for these additional explanatory variables are mostly small and insigni￿cant. This
would be expected due to the conditional interaction of the policies with industry labor volatility.
The mechanism results are broadly robust to these additional interactions, while the estimated
levels coe¢ cients shrink towards no e⁄ect.13
Panel C incorporates interactions of two other traits, the national population and the national
GDP per capita. The results of this test are a bit more mixed. The PE entry e⁄ect due to
labor insurance mechanisms decline somewhat in economic magnitude and becomes statistically
insigni￿cant due to larger standard errors. On the other hand, the intensive margin regressions
maintain much of their economic size and statistical strength.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Panel D includes interactions for di⁄erences across
countries in their legal origins. A number of studies conclude that the legal origins of countries
are important for their modern institutions and concomitant economic development. These
institutions and legal regimes impact the development of PE markets beyond the labor insurance
policies we explicitly model (e.g., Cumming and Johan 2009, Cumming et al. 2009). Botero
et al. (2004) ￿nd that legal origins explain more of the existing di⁄erences in labor regulations
across countries than recent political outcomes. Given these deep antecedents, we include
indicator variables for whether countries are of Germanic, Scandinavian, or UK legal origin, with
stronger when worker insurance policies favor LMEs over employment protection, conditional on the level of
worker insurance provided. This prediction is similar in spirit to Figures 2 and 3, but accounts for joint policy
determination and is invariant to including Anglo-Saxon nations. We ￿nd this prediction to be true, but these
results are subject to typical concerns of a cross-sectional analysis with country-level observations. These results
are available upon request.
13Further speci￿cations verify the robustness of the results to including metrics of product market regulations,
collective bargaining, government ownership of banks, total government expenditures per capita, average edu-
cation levels, technology opportunities modeled through patents issued by the European Patent O¢ ce, and the
level of captive investments.
19the reference category being French/Spanish. The legal origin dummies partly act as region-
industry ￿xed e⁄ects, too. These controls further emphasize the mechanism e⁄ect, suggesting
that insurance policy variations are important even within nations of similar legal origin.14
5.4 Alternative Mechanism Designs
In addition to the robustness check described in Table 7, we also tested several modi￿cations
to our index design. We ￿nd similar outcomes when replacing LbrInsMechc, which employs
a bounded radian measure of policy ratios, with a simple ratio of policy distances. Likewise,
we ￿nd similar results when modelling the overall insurance level through Euclidean distances
rather than linear distances. The Euclidean distance can be thought of as the length of a ray
from the origin of Figure 1 to the nation￿ s position in (EPR, LME) space. The estimated
importance of how labor insurance is provisioned is robust to both of these index variants, and
this stability holds for the other empirical ￿ndings of this paper.
One natural question is whether EPRs and LMEs should be weighted equally in determining
the labor insurance level. We are only aware of one study that attempts to estimate ￿LME
and ￿EPR directly. Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009) empirically evaluate whether EPRs or un-
employment insurance bene￿ts (UIBs, the largest portion of LME) better promote job security
as measured through the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) surveys. Strikingly,
these authors ￿nd that EPRs do not raise worker perceptions of security; if anything, Clark and
Postel-Vinay￿ s (2009) estimates imply stricter EPRs lower perceived labor market insurance by
private-sector workers. On the other hand, UIBs robustly increase perceived insurance.
As a ￿nal index variant, we used Clark and Postel-Vinay￿ s coe¢ cients to weight an alternative
g(:) function that replaces LbrInsLevelc. The importance of LbrInsMechc continues to hold,
whereas the level of insurance proxied by the worker security perception further weakens as a
predictor. This heavy weighting of the LMEs versus employment protection does, however,
make it more di¢ cult to separate the two e⁄ects when many covariate interactions are included.
This nonetheless reinforces the emphasis, both here and in Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009), on
the importance of insurance mechanisms.
Ultimately, there is no single approach for estimating the level of labor market insurance.
While employment protection and LMEs are likely the two most important policy levers for
providing labor insurance, other techniques do exist. Moreover, the outcome measures could be
extended from policy choices or worker security perceptions to other economic data (e.g., worker
14These classi￿cations follow La Porta et al. (1997). French/Spanish countries include Belgium, France, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Germanic countries include Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. Scandina-
vian countries include Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The UK origin countries include Ireland and
the UK. For this sample, the common versus civil law distinction overlaps entirely with the UK origin.
20income stability, job loss and gain rates). To some degree, the weighting employed will always
involve normative values as well as positive models, and these values di⁄er within and across
societies (e.g., Kerr 2007).
Nevertheless, we believe LbrInsMechc captures a meaningful, ￿rst-order policy trade-o⁄that
is evident empirically and grounded in theory (e.g., Pissarides 2001, Blanchard and Tirole 2007).
The conclusion of this study is that the mechanism used to provision labor market insurance
is important for PE formation. We are unable to draw consistent conclusions regarding the
level of insurance provided except that it is of lesser importance than the mechanism. The
transformed variables demonstrate the mechanism￿ s importance in an intuitive manner. We
hope that future research will further re￿ne our understanding of the g(:) function￿ s structure.
6 Conclusions
European economies empirically substitute between employment protection regulations and la-
bor market expenditures (e.g., unemployment insurance bene￿ts, job transition assistance) as
mechanisms for providing worker security. A growing body of theoretical and empirical evidence
￿nds employment protections act as a tax on ￿rm adjustments, while the incidence of labor ex-
penditures on this margin is less direct. Many European policy makers and business leaders
want to replicate US venture capital and buy-out communities in their home countries. Both
of these private equity groups, however, operate in dynamic environments that require frequent
adjustments of the labor forces of their portfolio companies. Their business models make these
investors very sensitive to strict labor regulations.
We ￿nd that worker insurance policies favoring labor expenditures over employment protec-
tion encourage greater private equity entry and larger investment levels. This is true for both
domestic investors and US-inbound venture capital investments. This e⁄ect is conditional on the
level of worker insurance provided, which is of lesser importance for private equity patterns than
the policy mechanisms employed. Policy choices regarding the optimal levels and mechanisms
of labor market insurance are complex and should consider many economic and non-economic
factors. This study highlights one factor that should in￿ uence the trade-o⁄between employment
protection and labor market expenditures.
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Fig. 4: Level & Mechanism Indices of Labor Insurance
 90 98 90-97 98-01 90-97 98-04 90-97 98-04 90-97 98-04 90-97 98-04
Austria 2.2 2.2 290 325 0 15 0 25 1.8 1.9 0.8 0.8
Belgium 3.2 2.2 760 842 11 40 3 48 2.9 2.5 0.8 1.0
Denmark 2.3 1.4 1469 1482 4 48 0 47 2.9 2.4 1.1 1.3
Finland 2.3 2.1 873 811 7 61 0 42 2.6 2.4 1.0 1.1
France 2.7 3.0 600 707 17 69 2 61 2.5 2.7 0.9 0.8
Germany 3.2 2.5 602 593 9 40 0 23 2.7 2.4 0.8 0.9
Ireland 0.9 0.9 548 461 8 35 2 146 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.3
Italy 3.6 2.7 188 234 7 37 1 13 2.2 1.9 0.4 0.6
Netherlands 2.7 2.1 732 726 25 99 10 67 2.6 2.3 0.9 1.0
Norway 2.9 2.7 554 427 17 57 0 24 2.5 2.3 0.8 0.8
Portugal 4.1 3.7 112 165 5 11 0 4 2.1 2.2 0.2 0.3
Spain 3.8 2.9 313 318 4 27 0 9 2.6 2.2 0.5 0.7
Sweden 3.5 2.2 983 865 19 159 2 59 3.2 2.5 0.8 1.0
Switzerland 1.1 1.1 425 466 9 46 2 64 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.2
UK 0.6 0.6 216 173 42 197 6 84 0.9 0.8 1.3 1.3




Level and Mechanism Indices of Labor Market Insurance are transformations of the EPR and LME policies.  The Level Index estimates the joint insurance provided 
through these two policies; higher values indicate greater worker insurance provision.  The Mechanism Index estimates the relative importance of the two policies; 
higher values indicate greater reliance on LMEs versus EPRs in the provision.  EPRs and the log value of LMEs per capita are transformed to have zero mean and unit 
standard deviation.  Univariate distances are measured from the lowest provision of each policy among the reporting countries (US EPR, Greece LME).  The Level 
Index averages these univariate distances.  The Mechanism Index is the radian measure of the transformed LME to EPR ratio.  The text provides additional details.
Expenditures of Labor Market of Labor Market
Notes:  The Employment Protection Regulations (EPR) Index is taken from the OECD.  It has a theoretical range of 0 to 5, with higher scores indicating stronger 
employment protection.  Labor market expenditures (LME) and populations are taken from the OECD Social Expenditures and Labour Force databases.  Domestic and 
US-sourced private equity (PE) investments are taken from the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) and Venture Economics (VE) databases, respectively.  
PE includes buy-out funds and venture capital placements.  Investments and expenditures are in nominal ECUs/Euros per capita.





Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for European Private Equity Sample
per Capita
Annual Labor Mkt. Level Index OECD Annual DomesticEstablishment Sector 1990-1997 1998-2004 1990-1997 1998-2004
Communications 0.3425 0.0317 3.7% 12.7% 10.3% 17.2%
Computer-Related  0.5216 0.0794 5.8% 9.0% 3.2% 12.0%
Others Electronics-Related 0.3599 0.0211 3.9% 2.4% 0.6% 4.1%
Biotechnology 0.4252 0.0397 2.1% 2.8% 11.4% 4.1%
Medical/Health-Related 0.3475 0.0190 4.2% 6.6% 13.4% 4.6%
Energy 0.4947 0.0520 1.4% 1.4% 0.2% 1.2%
Consumer-Related 0.4054 0.0334 21.2% 19.4% 26.3% 16.9%
Industrial Products and Services 0.3063 0.0285 13.6% 9.7% 1.4% 2.7%
Chemicals and Materials 0.2751 0.0263 3.5% 3.6% 4.8% 6.4%
Industrial Automation 0.3265 0.0507 1.1% 1.2% 0.1% 0.2%
Other Manufacturing 0.3670 0.0311 10.0% 8.0% 10.6% 8.4%
Transportation 0.3499 0.0214 4.7% 2.8% 4.4% 7.0%
Financial Services 0.3953 0.0334 4.0% 2.7% 3.0% 4.9%
Other Services 0.4126 0.0354 11.0% 8.9% 1.9% 3.8%
Agriculture n.a. n.a. 1.4% 0.5% 1.7% 0.5%
Construction n.a. n.a. 4.1% 2.8% 4.9% 4.4%
Other n.a. n.a. 4.4% 5.5% 1.8% 1.6%
Average (Unwtd) 0.3817 0.0359
US-Sourced Total Private 
Equity Investments
Notes:  US labor volatility metrics are calculated for establishments from US Census Bureau data for 1977-1999.  Volatility is defined as the mean 
absolute change in establishment employment from the previous year divided by the average employment in the current and previous year.  The 
sector-level calculation employs the same formula using industry-level data from 1992-1999.  Further details on the construction of the metrics are 
included in the text.  Domestic private equity investments are taken from the EVCA database.  US-sourced private equity investments are taken 
from the VE database.  Private equity includes buy-out funds and venture capital placements.  Values are presented as shares of total investments 
over the 1990-1997 and 1998-2004 sample periods.
Table 2: Sector-Level Descriptive Statistics
Domestic Total Private Equity 
Investments
US Calculations of Sector-
Level Labor Volatility(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OECD Employment Protection Index -0.030 -0.035 -0.107 -0.068 -0.077 -0.037
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.026) (0.019) (0.040) (0.025) (0.052) (0.035)
Log Labor Market Expenditures per Capita 0.057 0.065 0.091 0.132 0.083 0.121
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.034) (0.026) (0.046) (0.033) (0.059) (0.050)
Linear Combination for Policy Mechanism: 0.087 0.100 0.198 0.201 0.160 0.158
βLME-βEPR (0.051) (0.041) (0.067) (0.050) (0.085) (0.076)
Volatility Metric Employed Establish. Sector Establish. Sector Establish. Sector
Country and Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210
Notes:  Country-sector estimations consider private equity investments (PE) in Europe for 1990-2004.  The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is an 
indicator variable for PE investments above one Euro per capita in the country-sector.  The dependent variable in Columns 3 and 4 is the log count of PE 
investments made.  The dependent variable in Columns 5 and 6 is the log value of PE investments made.  Explanatory variables interact country-level 
employment regulations (EPR) and labor market expenditures per capita (LME) with sector-level labor volatility of establishments in the US.  Main effects 
are demeaned prior to interactions and are absorbed by country and sector fixed effects.  Variables are transformed to have unit standard deviation for 
interpretation.  Regressions include country and sector fixed effects, are weighted by country populations interacted with aggregate sector size, and report 
robust standard errors.   The bottom row presents the linear difference βLME-βEPR and its standard error.  This difference approximates a policy change 
that holds the level of worker insurance provided constant but adjusts the insurance mechanism from EPRs towards LMEs.
Table 3: European Domestic Private Equity Investments with Base Labor Market Policies
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin Intensive Margin
(0,1) Invest >1 Euro/Cap Log Count of Investments Log Value of Investments(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OECD Employment Protection Index -0.065 -0.049 -0.152 -0.110 -0.265 -0.198
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.024) (0.016) (0.064) (0.037) (0.132) (0.113)
Log Labor Market Expenditures per Capita 0.015 0.045 0.110 0.141 0.209 0.264
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.031) (0.028) (0.073) (0.049) (0.164) (0.153)
Linear Combination for Policy Mechanism: 0.080 0.094 0.263 0.250 0.474 0.462
βLME-βEPR (0.035) (0.027) (0.109) (0.076) (0.275) (0.260)
Volatility Metric Employed Establish. Sector Establish. Sector Establish. Sector
Country and Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 210 210 186 186 186 186
OECD Employment Protection Index -0.045 -0.035 -0.078 -0.031 0.020 0.048
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.021) (0.016) (0.049) (0.025) (0.074) (0.070)
Log Labor Market Expenditures per Capita -0.057 -0.036 0.057 0.103 -0.138 -0.106
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.030) (0.024) (0.051) (0.030) (0.100) (0.101)
Linear Combination for Policy Mechanism: -0.011 -0.001 0.135 0.134 -0.157 -0.154
βLME-βEPR (0.037) (0.029) (0.071) (0.045) (0.146) (0.150)
Volatility Metric Employed Establish. Sector Establish. Sector Establish. Sector
Country and Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 210 210 151 151 151 151
Notes:  See Table 3.
Table 4: US-Sourced Investments into Europe with Base Labor Market Policies
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin Intensive Margin
(0,1) Invest >1 Euro/Cap Log Count of Investments Log Value of Investments
A. US-Sourced Venture Capital Placements
B. US-Sourced Buy Out Placements(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Levels Index of Labor Market Insurance 0.041 0.048 0.044 0.105 0.057 0.113
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.033) (0.026) (0.048) (0.031) (0.064) (0.045)
Mechanism Index of Labor Market Insurance 0.072 0.078 0.156 0.162 0.137 0.135
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.042) (0.034) (0.054) (0.041) (0.070) (0.063)
Volatility Metric Employed Establish. Sector Establish. Sector Establish. Sector
Country and Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210
Notes:   See Table 3.  The Level and Mechanism Indices of Labor Market Insurance are transformations of country-level employment protection (EPR) and 
labor market expenditures (LME) policies.  The Level Index estimates the joint insurance provided through these two policies; higher values indicate greater 
worker insurance provision.  The Mechanism Index estimates the relative importance of the two policies; higher values indicate greater reliance on LMEs 
versus EPRs in the provision.  The construction of these indices is detailed in the text and Table 1.
Table 5: European Domestic Private Equity Investments with Transformed Labor Market Policies
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin Intensive Margin
(0,1) Invest >1 Euro/Cap Log Count of Investments Log Value of Investments(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Levels Index of Labor Market Insurance -0.021 0.013 0.039 0.089 0.112 0.176
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.033) (0.030) (0.074) (0.045) (0.122) (0.106)
Mechanism Index of Labor Market Insurance 0.053 0.068 0.205 0.199 0.378 0.358
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.029) (0.024) (0.087) (0.059) (0.200) (0.195)
Volatility Metric Employed Establish. Sector Establish. Sector Establish. Sector
Country and Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 210 210 186 186 186 186
Levels Index of Labor Market Insurance -0.073 -0.045 0.020 0.093 -0.127 -0.082
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.031) (0.025) (0.058) (0.031) (0.090) (0.080)
Mechanism Index of Labor Market Insurance -0.024 -0.011 0.105 0.114 -0.143 -0.147
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.032) (0.025) (0.054) (0.031) (0.112) (0.109)
Volatility Metric Employed Establish. Sector Establish. Sector Establish. Sector
Country and Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 210 210 151 151 151 151
Notes:   See Table 5.
Table 6: US-Sourced Investments into Europe with Transformed Labor Market Policies
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin Intensive Margin
(0,1) Invest >1 Euro/Cap Log Count of Investments Log Value of Investments
A. US-Sourced Venture Capital Placements
B. US-Sourced Buy Out Placements(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Levels Index of Labor Market Insurance 0.041 0.048 0.044 0.105 0.057 0.113
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.033) (0.026) (0.048) (0.031) (0.064) (0.045)
Mechanism Index of Labor Market Insurance 0.072 0.078 0.156 0.162 0.137 0.135
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.042) (0.034) (0.054) (0.041) (0.070) (0.063)
Levels Index of Labor Market Insurance -0.025 -0.010 -0.004 0.070 -0.047 0.030
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.036) (0.039) (0.061) (0.049) (0.063) (0.043)
Mechanism Index of Labor Market Insurance 0.063 0.078 0.162 0.102 0.158 0.090
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.046) (0.037) (0.065) (0.050) (0.076) (0.060)
Levels Index of Labor Market Insurance 0.010 -0.005 0.019 0.041 -0.003 0.015
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.041) (0.036) (0.053) (0.042) (0.061) (0.041)
Mechanism Index of Labor Market Insurance 0.067 0.050 0.151 0.121 0.177 0.116
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.060) (0.050) (0.077) (0.059) (0.084) (0.069)
Levels Index of Labor Market Insurance 0.008 0.029 0.037 0.171 0.052 0.142
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.061) (0.039) (0.083) (0.050) (0.096) (0.050)
Mechanism Index of Labor Market Insurance 0.081 0.082 0.164 0.145 0.147 0.126
Interacted with US Labor Volatility by Sector (0.048) (0.035) (0.057) (0.042) (0.062) (0.050)
Volatility Metric Employed Establish. Sector Establish. Sector Establish. Sector
Log Count of Investments Log Value of Investments
Notes:   See Table 5.  Panel B includes additional interactions of sector labor volatility with the strength of IPO markets, corporate tax rates, business entry 
regulation barriers, the share of national investments made by public investment funds, and the share of buy-out investment in the country.  Panel C includes 
interactions with national populations and GDP per capitas.  Panel D includes interactions with the legal origins of countries.
D. Including Extended Interactions of Legal Origins
C. Including Extended Interactions of Other National Traits
A. Base Regressions with Country and Sector Fixed Effects
B. Including Extended Interactions of Other National Policies
Table 7: Robustness Checks on European Domestic Private Equity Investments
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin Intensive Margin
(0,1) Invest >1 Euro/CapApp. Table 1: EVCA Sector Definitions
Communications - Internet Technology: browsers, portals, search engines and other internet enabling technologies, website 
design and consultancy, ISPs.  Telecommunications (Hardware): voice and data communications equipment, 
cable/mobile/satellite network equipment excluding telecommunications carriers.  Telecommunications (Carriers): 
cable/mobile/satellite telecommunications carriers.  Communications (other): TV and radio broadcasting, media houses, 
publishing.
Computer-Related - Computer (Hardware): computer mainframes, laptops, minicomputers, PDA/hand-held devices, optical 
scanning equipment, voice synthesis/recognition equipment.  Computer (Semiconductors): semiconductors, electronic 
components (e.g., integrated circuits, transistors), semiconductor fabrication equipment.  Computer (Services): data 
processing, hardware maintenance, IT consulting, IT training.  Computer (Software): application software products, 
operating systems and systems-related software for all types of hardware, systems integration, software development.  
Includes manufacturers, resellers, and distributors.
Other Electronics Related - batteries, power supplies, fibre optics, analytical and scientific instrumentation.
Biotechnology - agricultural/animal biotechnology (e.g., plant diagnostics), industrial biotechnology (e.g., derived 
chemicals), biotechnology related research and production equipment
Medical/Health-Related - Medical (Healthcare): health institutions, hospital management, handicap aids & basic healthcare 
supplies.  Medical (Instruments/Devices): technologically advanced diagnostic & therapeutic products and services.  Medical 
(Pharmaceuticals): drug development, manufacture and supply.
Energy - oil and gas exploration and production, exploration and drilling services and equipment, coal related, energy 
conservation related, alternative energy.
Consumer-Related - Consumer (Retail): retailing of consumer products and services (including leisure and recreational 
products).  Consumer (Other): manufacture and supply of consumer products.
Industrial Products and Services - industrial equipment and machinery, pollution and recycling related, industrial services.
Chemicals and Materials - agricultural chemicals, commodity chemicals, specialty or performance chemicals/materials, 
coating and adhesives, membranes and membrane-based products.
Industrial Automation - industrial measurement and sensing equipment, process control equipment, robotics, machine vision 
systems, numeric and computerized control of machine tools.
Other Manufacturing - business products and supplies, office furniture, textiles, hardware and plumbing supplies, pulp and 
paper, printing and binding, packaging products and systems.
Transportation - airlines, railways, buses, airfield and other transportation services, mail and package shipment. 
Financial Services - banking, insurance related, real estate, securities and commodities brokers.
Other Services - engineering services, advertising and public relations, distributors, importers and wholesalers; consulting 
services (excluding IT consulting – see Computer: Services).
Agriculture - animal husbandry, crop cultivation, fishing, forestry.
Construction - construction services, manufacture of building materials, manufacture of pre-fabricated buildings and systems.
Other - mining, utilities, conglomerates.
Source:  Compiled from EVCA Private Equity Survey Guidance Notes and Glossary by EVCA (2005), Thomson Venture 
Economics, and PriceWaterhouseCoopers.